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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPENSATION
LAW IN HUNGARY
Peter Paczolay*
In 1989, Hungary and other East European nations entered a new
period in history. They began the transition to democracy and free
markets, a transition that is proving to be a very difficult, complex,
and unprecedented task. The twentieth century has seen other Euro-
pean countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, evolve from dicta-
torial political regimes into democratic societies, but in Eastern
Europe this transition will be different. In Eastern Europe, former
socialist countries must reorganize state-owned and centralized econo-
mies. Economic changes, contrary to the view held by Richard Ep-
stein,' will provide new and interesting experiences.
One of the most important issues raised by this complex economic
and legal transition is the question of property rights. This question
encompasses the reformulation of property rights in the Civil Code,
land reform, and privatization, as well as compensation for nationali-
zation and injustices under the Communist regime. It is extremely
important that all former socialist countries begin to address these per-
tinent problems. In most East European countries, these complex
questions have been addressed through legislation. Hungary is the
only country, however, where the legislative acts have passed the scru-
tiny of judicial review. This article analyzes the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court's decisions regarding a specific problem of property
rights, namely the Compensation Law. It does not attempt to examine
the details of broad subjects such as property rights or privatization.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE LEGAL
TRANSITION
The Hungarian transition to democracy is peculiar in that the
Constitutional Court is playing an important role in the revision of the
entire legal system. The socialist theory of the state rejected the idea
of separation of powers and refused to entrust the protection of consti-
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tutionality to an independent organ such as the Constitutional Court.
The Communist government wanted to preserve the supremacy of
Parliament and aimed to create a Constitutional Court with only lim-
ited jurisdiction. It intended to withhold from the Court the right to
annul Acts of Parliament. During recent years, it became obvious to
Hungarian reformers that an independent Constitutional Court would
be necessary in the new political and legal system.
In the summer of 1989, the independence of the Constitutional
Court became a central issue in negotiations among political groups.
The issue was discussed extensively during the Opposition Round Ta-
ble talks. At this time, the framers of the new constitutional order
could not foresee the oncoming dramatic changes in the other coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc. The opposition feared that the key positions in
the political system would remain in the hands of the Communists; at
that time, seventy-five percent of the members of Parliament belonged
to the ruling Communist Party.2 In addition, the Cabinet was Com-
munist, and Imre Pozsgay, a prominent figure of that party, was ex-
pected to be elected President of the Republic.
The opposition submitted two basic proposals. The first was that
every citizen should have the right to challenge the constitutionality of
the legal norms before the Constitutional Court. The second was that
the Court should also review the constitutionality of legislative acts.
These proposals were elaborated by Lszl6 S61yom (who at the time of
the roundtable talks was a member of the Hungarian Democratic Fo-
rum and later became the first President of the Constitutional Court)
and P6ter T61gyessy (present head of the Alliance of Free Democrats).
Communist Party experts argued against acceptance of the opposi-
tion's proposals, but the head of the government's delegation ignored
the warnings. Thus, the opposition easily managed to realize its goals
concerning the expansive role of judicial review.
Act No. 32 creating the Constitutional Court was enacted in Octo-
ber 1989, and soon after Parliament elected the first five members of
the Court. On January 1, 1990 the Constitutional Court commenced
its functions.3 Five additional members were elected by the new,
2. The ruling party was then called the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; its successor in
October 1989 was called the Hungarian Socialist Party.
3. The jurisdiction and the functions of the Constitutional Court are regulated in section 32/
A of the Hungarian constitution and in Act No. 32 of 1989 on the Constitutional Court. A
MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. IV, § 32/A (Hung.) translated in 7
ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 13 (1990); 1989 6vi XXXII tbrv6ny az Alkotminybir6sigr61 [Law XXXII on the Con-
stitutional Court], Oct. 30, 1989, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 77/1989, at 1283 (Hung.) (unofficial
translation on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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freely-elected Parliament in mid-1990.
The jurisdiction and power of the Court, even by international
comparison, is very broad. For instance, the Court can review the
constitutionality of legal drafts before their legislative enactment and
has the right to review both legislative acts and sublegislative norms,
declaring them null and void in case of unconstitutionality. The Court
also gives advisory opinions at the request of high State officers. In the
first two years of operation, the Court proved its powerful role in the
new political system by delivering a series of very important decisions
that pertained to capital punishment, the interpretation of human dig-
nity, equal protection, tax issues, the compensation acts, presidential
powers, abortion, and lifting the statute of limitations for political
crimes.
Meanwhile, the actio popularis (the right for all citizens to seek
assistance from the Constitutional Court) resulted in a flood of re-
quests on the part of citizens, which in turn created a tremendous
overload for the Court. Nonetheless, judicial review essentially func-
tioned well in Hungary, despite the lack of tradition and experience in
that field. The Court's property rights decisions, in particular, provide
insight into the basic characteristics and problems of judicial review in
Hungary.
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER SOCIALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONFISCATION
Hungary's stormy history created a very complicated legacy for
the new regime. Citizens were embittered over the offenses they en-
dured under Communism, and they expressed a need for justice. In
order to fulfill these expectations, the new government had to compen-
sate people for the illegalities of the previous political regimes.
Confiscations for political reasons go back as far as 1939, when the
so-called "Second Jewish Law" violated the property rights of Jewish
citizens. After the "liberation" of 1945, long overdue steps were taken
to solve the agrarian problem. Unfortunately, the land reform was
mixed with political revenge. On March 18, 1945, the Provisional
Government issued a decree abolishing the great estates and transfer-
ring the land either to peasant families or to State and communal
property. This land reform has been accurately described as "one of
the most radical redistributions of land carried out anywhere after
World War II."14 The land of war criminals, members of fascist orga-
4. I.T. BEREND & G. RANKI, HUNGARY: A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 185
(1974).
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nizations, and "traitors of the fatherland" was simply confiscated, and
the land of others was taken without paying the compensation re-
quired by law. In addition, under the terms of the Potsdam Agree-
ment, approximately 240,000 of Hungary's ethnic Germans were
expelled to Germany. Nationalization programs also began in 1945,
greatly affecting various industrial, real estate, and retail-trade
systems.
The inevitable "seizure of power" by the Communists occurred in
1948. On August 20, 1949 the socialist constitution of Hungary was
promulgated, declaring the priority of public property.5 The emerging
dictatorship continued to confiscate the property of the "class ene-
mies." Specifically, property rights were regulated in detail by the
Civil Code, enacted in 1959. This Code reaffirmed the priority of pub-
lic property, listing in conformity with Article 6 of the Constitution
that resources such as minerals, forests, water, mines, means of trans-
portation, banks, and postal services are exclusively State or public
property. Likewise, many provisions clearly favored State or public
property (i.e., the property of cooperatives or so-called social
organizations).
The two forms of socialized ownership were State ownership and
group (mainly cooperative) ownership. To justify State ownership, a
rationale was advanced that it "is linked with workers who do not own
the enterprise but, as citizens, have a share in the social ownership of
the totality of the means of production."' 6 State or public property, in
the terminology of socialist law called "social ownership," was pro-
tected by Civil and Criminal Codes as the highest category in the hier-
archy of ownership.
The economic reforms initiated in 1968 under the name of the
"New Economic Mechanism" also affected property rights, but the
hierarchy of ownership remained the same. The reforms changed the
management of state property, as the regulations gave more and more
rights to the managers of state-owned enterprises to make and carry
out their own decisions. Also, after 1984, employees had a considera-
ble voice in the basic "strategic" decisions of enterprises, as more than
seventy percent of the enterprises were led by self-managed councils.
In 1989, the fundamental change in the political system cleared the
5. Art. 4. (1) of the 1949 text of the Constitution provides: "In the Hungarian People's Re-
public the bulk of the means of production is owned, as public property, by the state, by public
bodies or by co-operative organizations." A MAGYAR K&ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitu-
tion] of 1949, art. 4(1) (Hung.) translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC 4 (1949).
6. GYULA EORSI, COMPARATIVE CIVIL (PRIVATE) LAW 307 (1979).
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way for a complex transformation. In the process of redefining the
role of the State, the area of property rights has also undergone grad-
ual yet fundamental changes. The basic revision of the Constitution
was promulgated on October 23, 1989. It contains the basic principles
of property rights. These important provisions are:
" the Property Rights Clause - Art. 13. (1) "The Republic of
Hungary shall guarantee the right to property;"
* the Equal Protection Of Property Clause - Art. 9. (1) "The
Republic of Hungary is a market economy where public and pri-
vate ownership shall enjoy equal rights and equal protection;"
* the Takings Clause - Art. 13. (2) "Property may be expropri-
ated only exceptionally and out of public interest, in cases and in
the manner determined by an Act, with full, unconditional and
immediate compensation."
On the basis of these constitutional provisions, the legislature was obli-
gated to review entire branches of the legal system in order to abolish
the hierarchy of ownership and restrictions on private activities. By
1991, the chapter on property rights of the Civil Code was completely
rewritten. 7 These legal reforms, however, have created only the
framework for a real market economy based on private ownership; to
have true private property, privatization of the state sector must
occur.
PRIVATIZATION AND HISTORICAL JUSTICE
In Hungary, various economic reforms were directed at state en-
terprises to encourage self-management and to drive them toward a
market economy. The modest success of this reform program urged
the Communist government to hasten the pace of the reforms. The
Economic Associations Act (passed in October 1988) provided for the
privatization of state-owned enterprises by converting them into joint-
stock companies and allowing them to issue shares which are sold to
individuals. This step led to spontaneous privatization and made it
possible for managers to take over firms. Even today, Hungary is the
only country that does not curtail the practice of spontaneous priva-
tization by managers or outside investors, yet clearly rejects privatiza-
tion through mass distribution of shares to citizens.8
7. 1991 6vi XIV t6rv6ny [Act XIV of 1991 (on the Amendment of the Civil Code)], Apr. 30,
1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eeleg File (1991 U.S. Dep't of Commerce-NTIS
translation). For the full English text of the pre-amendment Civil Code, see 1991 HATLYOS
MAGYAR JOGSZABALYOK [Hungarian Rules of Law in Force] Nos. 21-24 (Oct. 15 - Nov. 15,
1990).
8. On the different methods of privatization of state enterprises, see ALAN H. GELB &
[Vol. 13:806
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In several East European countries, the issue of privatization,
which is in itself a very difficult and complicated task, is directly re-
lated to the question of compensation for past injustices. Different so-
lutions pertaining to the procedures and ranges of compensation have
been offered. One clearly defined approach would be to grant no com-
pensation at all, whereas the opposite solution would be an in-kind
return of expropriated goods. An intermediate solution requiring lim-
ited compensation in the form of vouchers, however, is the one most
likely to be followed.
Other East European countries also have attempted to deal with
the compensation issue. In the former East Germany, more than one
million property restitution claims have been filed by private individu-
als. The Polish government is presently seeking a resolution for the
compensation of expropriated former owners. Czechoslovakia's legis-
lators enacted two statutes dealing with the restitution of expropriated
property. First, the Restitution Law, passed on October 2, 1990, pro-
vides for the reprivatization of some 70,000 smaller businesses and
properties nationalized by the Communists between 1955 and 1961. A
second statute, the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, was passed on
February 21, 1991; it makes restitution possible in the form of in-kind
return of property for individuals only (thus excluding political parties
and churches). It covers only property confiscated from February 25,
1948 to January 1, 1990. Financial compensation in the form of either
cash payments or vouchers will be made in exceptional cases when
considerable improvements to property were made and the former
owners are not able to pay their expenses.9 On February 18, 1992, the
Czech legislature approved an amendment to the law on the regulation
of ownership relations to land and other agricultural property, which
waived the upper limit of 250 hectares for the restitution of plots.
Under this amendment, aristocratic classes such as the Lobkovic, Kin-
ski, and Schwarzenberg families can claim back large forest areas.
In Hungary, the Independent Smallholders Party raised the issue
of reprivatization when it had essentially no other issue to advance
during the electoral campaign in the spring of 1990. After the election
the Smallholders became the third largest party in Hungary; they not
only participated in the coalition government, but also succeeded in
forcing it to draft a bill on the reprivatization of agricultural land.
(The original political program of the largest party, the Hungarian
CHERYL W. GREY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN Eu-
ROPE 39-40 (World Bank Policy and Research Series No. 17, 1991).
9. Jan Obrman, Two Landmark Bills on Privatization Approved, RFE/RL REPORT ON EAST-
ERN EUROPE, Mar. 15, 1991, at 12.
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Democratic Forum, had not even mentioned reprivatization.) In or-
der to clear up the situation, in 1990 the prime minister, J6zsef Antall,
asked the Constitutional Court for an advisory opinion on. the consti-
tutionality of the reprivatization.
COMPENSATION CASE I - AN ADVISORY OPINION
The prime minister asked the Court whether it constitutes discrim-
ination according to Article 70/A of the Constitution for compensa-
tion procedures to provide for certain people's former property to be
reprivatized (i.e. returned in kind), while other people's property
would not be returned to them. The petition explained the compensa-
tion policy of the Government:l° it considered privatization to be the
basic goal of the transformation of the ownership system. The general
principle of privatization was to sell state property to new owners in
exchange for payment, while giving former owners, whose property
was expropriated during the Communist regime, partial compensa-
tion. The settlement of land ownership would have been an exception
to these principles.
The first question raised in the Government's petition was whether
it constitutes discrimination among the former owners if the kind of
property (the basic distinction being between land and other kinds of
property) determines whether the property was given back. The sec-
ond question raised by the prime minister was whether it is constitu-
tional to take land from the cooperatives without expropriation
proceedings and compensation. According to the plans of the Govern-
ment, those lands in the possession of cooperatives which were not
acquired in a "normal" legal manner determined by the Civil Code
would serve without any compensation as the basis for reprivatization.
Act No. 32 of 1989 makes it possible to ask the Constitutional
Court for advisory opinions. The Court is obliged to interpret the pro-
visions of the Constitution relating to the requests of certain institu-
tions (the Parliament or the cabinet) and high State officers (e.g., the
President of the Republic or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court).
The advisory opinion is one of those decisions that may, and usually
does, involve the judiciary in political questions. It is also dangerous
because of the general nature of precedent. The same questions may
come to the Court again regarding specific situations, and then the
judges are bound by their previous decisions. The Justices of the
United States Supreme Court rejected the idea of advising the other
10. I use the word 'Government' in this Article in the sense commonly used in parliamentary
systems: it refers to the prime minister and the cabinet ministers.
[Vol. 13:806
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branches on general questions as early as in 1793.11 The advisory
opinion had an unfortunate history in West Germany, and that juris-
diction of the West German Constitutional Court was abolished in
1956. The fact that some constitutional courts may be asked for advi-
sory opinions clearly reveals that European constitutional courts are
not solely judicial organs, but often have extrajudicial and even polit-
ical tasks.
Such tasks confronted the Hungarian Constitutional Court when it
was required to issue an advisory opinion in response to the prime
minister's petition. Later, the firm language of the advisory opinion
created difficulties for the Court when the Compensation Law was
challenged again, and the issue came back to the Court. In another
case, the Constitutional Court narrowed its jurisdiction in this contro-
versial area and successfully resisted an effort to become involved in
the affairs of the legislature. There, the finance minister asked the
Constitutional Court to interpret several provisions of the Constitu-
tion with regard to the drafting of a law raising mortgage interest
rates. The petition also presented three different versions of the draft.
The Court pointed out the dangers of a broad interpretation of its
power to give advisory opinions, stating that this might easily lead to a
situation where the competent legislative organs would request "con-
stitutional interpretation" from the Constitutional Court before the
drafting of acts or even before making administrative decisions. "This
would inevitably result in that the Constitutional Court assumes the
responsibility of the legislative and even of the executive branch, and
this would create a sort of government by the Constitutional Court."' 12
This would contradict the constitutional principle of the separation of
powers.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
The first question raised in the government's petition was whether
it constitutes discrimination among former owners if the kind of prop-
erty determines whether the property was given back. The Court ana-
lyzed this question under the General Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.13 According to this clause, the Republic of Hungary
11. Correspondence between Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Chief Justice John Jay
and the Associate Justices (July 18 - Aug. 8, 1793), in PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at 65-67 (3d ed. 1988).
12. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1990, Alkotmfinybir6sig [Constitutional Court] No. 31/
1990(XII.18)AB, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 128/1990 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with
the Michigan Journal of International Law).
13. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution], supra note 3, ch. XII, § 70/
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shall ensure for all persons in its territory human and civil rights with-
out discrimination on account of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other views, national or social origins, ownership of assets,
birth, or any other grounds. The Constitutional Court also took into
consideration both the Property Rights Clause and the Equal Protec-
tion Of Property Clause.
This was not the first case in which the Court faced the problem of
equal protection. As early as April 1990, in its decision No. 9/1990
(IV.25),14 the Court had outlined its interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause regarding the constitutionality of reverse discrimina-
tion.'5 Interestingly enough, a majority of Hungarian citizens prefer a
strictly formal interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. They
have a perception of equality as the formally equal distribution of ben-
efits and burdens. They consider it unconstitutional if somebody is in
a better position than they are. This concept is a result of the continu-
ous propaganda of the value of equality under the socialist regime.
In this earlier reverse discrimination case, the petitioner challenged
the constitutionality of a provision of the Income Tax Law that
granted special tax benefits to families with at least three children or to
single parents with two children. The Court rejected the claim, argu-
ing that "the ban on discrimination does not mean that any discrimi-
nation, including even discrimination intended to achieve a greater
social equality, is forbidden."' 6 Moreover, the Constitution itself al-
lows the positive or reverse discrimination aimed at eliminating ine-
qualities of opportunity.17
In addition, the Court gave a broader interpretation to the Equal
Protection Clause. Equal protection in this broader sense means the
"equal right to human dignity." Although human dignity is one of the
most flexible and vague concepts of constitutional law, the Constitu-
tion lays down an inherent right to human dignity.' 8 The drafters
must have borrowed this concept from the German Basic Law.19 The
14. Judgment of Apr. 25, 1990, Alkotminybir6sig [Constitutional Court] No. 9/
1990(IV.25)AB, MAGYAR KOZL6NY No. 36/1990 (Hung.).
15. But, as Chief Justice S61yom skeptically remarked, the politicians are not likely to have
known about this decision in a rather insignificant case. Lszl6 S61yom, The First Year of the
Constitutional Court, 33 ACTA IURIDICA HUNGARICA (forthcoming 1992).
16. Decision No. 9/1990, supra note 14.
17. See A MAGYAR KLZTARSASG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution], supra note 3 at ch. XII,
§ 70/A.
18. Id. § 54(l).
19. Article 1(1) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) says: "The dignity of man is inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." GG art. 1(1). For the interpreta-
tion of this provision by the German Federal Constitutional Court, see DONALD P. KOMMERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 305-65
(1989).
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Court, by referring to the "equal right to human dignity," set up a
procedural scrutiny for equal protection. "The ban on discrimination
means that all people must be treated as equal (as persons with equal
dignity) by law. That means that the fundamental right to human
dignity may not be impaired, and the criteria of the entitlements and
benefits shall be determined with the same respect and prudence, and
with the same degree of consideration of individual interests."'20 Thus,
the Court transformed the requirement for equality into the require-
ment that all persons be treated with equal dignity.
The language of the Court's argument is clearly related to Ronald
Dworkin's explanation of affirmative action cases. 21 Dworkin differ-
entiates between two different sorts of rights. The first is the right to
equal treatment, which is the right to an equal distribution of some
opportunity or resource or burden. The second is the right to treat-
ment as an equal, which is the right to be treated with the same respect
as anyone else, not the right to receive the same distribution of some
burden or benefit. 22 The Court combined the right to be treated with
the same respect and the concept of human dignity, thus transforming
Dworkin's conception into the right to equal dignity.
Actually, the scrutiny of treatment as an equal is a sort of final
limit on reverse discrimination. Otherwise, reverse discrimination is
acceptable. "If a social purpose not in conflict with the Constitution,
or a constitutional right may only be achieved if equality in the nar-
rower sense is not met, then such a positive discrimination shall not be
declared unconstitutional. '23 This means that the achievement of an
important social goal or the realization of a fundamental right justifies
reverse discrimination which obviously hurts the principle of equality
in the narrower sense of the (quantitatively) equal distribution of as-
sets and choices.
In responding to the first question of the prime minister in Com-
pensation Case I, the Court examined how the privatization program
of the Government could fit the scrutiny of treatment as an equal. The
Court found that the program does not give any justification for the
20. Decision No. 9/1990, supra note 14.
21. The procedure of the Constitutional Court is that the President of the Court assigns the
case to one of the judges who prepares the draft of the decision. Then the draft is circulated and
the judges are asked to make their written comments on it. Finally, the session of the Court
discusses the draft. Hence the final text of the decision is mostly the result of a common effort.
Nevertheless, the judge preparing the draft usually has a decisive impact on the final text. There-
fore, since 1991, at the end of the decisions it is noted who delivered the opinion of the Court. In
the present case this was not noted yet, but the draft was written by Chief Justice Lfiszl6 S61yom,
and he also elaborated the theory of "the right to equal personal dignity."
22. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1978).
23. Decision No. 9/1990, supra note 14.
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preferred position of former land-owners and, in general, reflects con-
ceptual uncertainty concerning the relationship among privatization,
reprivatization, and partial compensation. Therefore, the Court tried
to clarify the meaning of these terms. In the interpretation of the
Court, privatization involves the assignment of state property to pri-
vate ownership, whereas reprivatization is the return of assets formerly
possessed by private persons but presently in the possession of the
State. The Government used the term compensation in a special sense:
the sole legal basis for the partial compensation was fairness. The
"fairness argument" became crucially important to the further history
of compensation.
The very definite language of the decision underlined the principle
that the former owners have no constitutional or subjective right to
compensation, and the State has no obligation to compensate them.
Compensation is a gratuitous act of the State, based exclusively on its
sovereign decision. This argument of the Court had two far-reaching
political effects: it gave the Government a free hand to determine the
measure of the compensation and, to the great disappointment of the
former owners, diminished their claim to a sort of morally justified
right with no legally binding force. Thus, the decision upset the
Smallholders, but gave the prime minister protection against the
Smallholders' claims and pressure.
The Court then examined whether the discrimination among for-
mer owners and non-owners is in conformity with the Constitution.
The argument followed the line designated by the above-mentioned
former decision, namely applying the right to equal dignity test. "The
constitutionality of the discrimination depends on whether the dis-
crimination between owners and non-owners is realized in a procedure
where the interests of former owners and non-owners have been
weighed with the same degree of prudence and impartiality. ' 24 The
justification for discrimination within the group of former owners
would be the purpose of achieving a more complete social equality, for
the Constitution permits the positive discrimination only in order to
promote the attainment of equality.
The ruling of the Court pointed out that there are at least two
instances of unconstitutional discrimination in the Government's pro-
gram: first, the discrimination among the former owners and non-
owners in the process of privatization, and second, the discrimination
among the former owners according to the type of the property. The
24. Judgment of Oct. 4, 1990, Alkotminybir6sig [Constitutional Court] No. 21/
1990(X.4)AB, MAGYAR K6ZL6NY No. 98/1990 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law).
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position of the Constitutional Court was that "in this particular case
differentiating on the basis of the type of the property becomes dis-
crimination against persons since it relates to the acquisition of prop-
erty." 25 The Court concluded its interpretation of Article 70/A of the
Constitution by stating that "it is a discrimination against persons if
certain persons' former property is reprivatized, while other persons'
property is not returned to their possession, therefore, the Constitu-
tional Court proclaimed this discrimination unconstitutional. '26
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
The second question raised by the Government's position is
whether it is constitutional to take land from the cooperatives without
expropriation proceedings and compensation. The Takings Clause of
the Hungarian Constitution is very firm: it permits expropriation only
subject to very rigorous conditions, and it requires full, unconditional,
and immediate compensation. The unusually stark language of this
provision must be a reaction to the unlawful expropriations during the
socialist era. The spirit of the problem was whether the Court should
apply these very strict provisions to the cooperatives. The Court took
the position that the Constitution must apply to all cases and to all
persons, implicitly endeavoring to set up neutral constitutional princi-
ples in the interpretation. Neutrality in this sense means that the con-
stitutional principles and provisions apply equally to everybody, and
the past does not justify discrimination or other violations of the
Constitution.
This implicit position of the Court provoked sharp criticism from
some political groups, mainly from those that suffered severe injustices
under the Communist regime. The critics even questioned the very
legitimacy of the Constitutional Court; some stated that judicial re-
view is not a necessary element of a constitutional State or of the rule
of law. According to these critics, the Court acts contrary to the pop-
ular will expressed by the parliamentary majority. In the second ques-
tion raised by the Government's petition, the real issue was the
reprivatization of land owned by agricultural cooperatives without ex-
propriation and compensation procedures. This was a delicate issue
because these cooperatives were formed not voluntarily, but by using
coercive measures against peasants and smallholders. This coercion
also was used in the incorporation of private land into the coopera-
tives. The standpoint of the former smallholders was that these
25. Id.
26. Id.
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properties were stolen, and, therefore, the protection of property rights
should not apply to them.
The Court, after some hesitation, took a formal, normativist posi-
tion. It considered the Constitution as a strict norm which should be
enforced under any circumstances, where past injustices would not in-
fluence the present position of the constitutional institutions. The test
of the cooperatives' constitutionality is voluntary association, irrespec-
tive of the history of their formation. Under Hungarian law, the only
organ competent to decide whether a cooperative exists on the basis of
voluntary or involuntary association is the general meeting of the
members of the cooperative. The legal rules effective at the time of the
decision allowed for both the closing down of a cooperative upon the
decision of the general meeting and the departure of a member, but did
not allow the distribution of the cooperative's property. Recently,
however, the regulation has changed: the new regulation on the coop-
eratives makes it possible for the members of the agricultural coopera-
tives to leave the cooperative, and the cooperative must assign them
their proportion of property.27
The Court's formal argument concluded with the strict protection
of the cooperatives' property. In the Court's interpretation, the Prop-
erty Rights Clause of the Constitution means that "the Republic of
Hungary guarantees the right to property including the right of agri-
cultural cooperatives to the arable land they own."' 28 The taking of
property from cooperatives without immediate, unconditional, and
full compensation violates the Takings Clause of the Constitution, and
is therefore unconstitutional, according to the ruling of the Court.
The ruling of the Court was formal and normative in terms of con-
stitutionality, and it formulated the Court's policy on the strict obser-
vation of the rule of law. In contrast to such decisions of the Court,
the acts of the legislature are the result of freely raised political argu-
ments and concurring interests. If the Court accepted the same argu-
ments, and made decisions in a similar way, arbitrarily taking into
consideration the different principles, policies and interests, it would
become a second legislative chamber. The role of judicial review,
however, is not political deliberation but the control of constitutional-
ity. Therefore, the Constitutional Court must adhere to objective stan-
27. 1992 6vi I t6rv6ny a szovetkezetekr~l [Act No. I on the Cooperatives], Jan. 20, 1992,
MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 6/1992, at 73 (Hung.); 1992 6vi II t6rvgny a sz6vetkezetekr6l sz616
1992 6vi I tbrviny hatilybalpgs&61 6s az itmeneti szabfilyokr61 [Act No. II on the Transitory
Provisions Regarding The Law On Cooperatives], Jan. 20, 1992, MAGYAR KOZLbNY No. 6/
1992, at 86 (Hung.).
28. Decision No. 21/1990, supra note 24.
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dards29 in the interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, the
Court in Compensation Case I, and in other cases as well, properly
made efforts to define objective standards and follow those neutral
principles.30
COMPENSATION CASE II - SELF-RESTRAINT OR ACTIVISM?
During the ongoing discussion on the draft of the Compensation
Bill, fifty-two parliamentary representatives (all members of the largest
opposition party, the Free Democrats) proposed that the Constitu-
tional Court review the constitutionality of some provisions of the bill.
The resulting decision of the Court consists of two sharply different
parts. The first part deals with the nature of preventive norm control
and rejects the request to review the provisions of a bill which had not
been decided yet by the Parliament. But the Court, contradicting its
position in the first part of the reasoning, adds a second part. This
second part enters into the discussion of the challenged provisions and
gives guidelines to the legislature. Thus, the decision illustrates the
Court's wavering between reasonable self-restraint and activism.
In order to analyze this case, it is necesssary to understand the
procedural peculiarities of judicial review in Hungary. The jurisdic-
tion of the Constitutional Court includes both preventive and repres-
sive norm control. Repressive norm control is the constitutional
review of enacted laws; this is the most frequent and important juris-
diction of the Constitutional Court. It gives the Court the right to
adjudicate the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament. This is
the most significant check on the supremacy of Parliament. This au-
thority is further strengthened by the possibility that anybody can ini-
tiate the repressive norm control of parliamentary acts.
Preventive norm control, on the other hand, means the constitu-
tional review of laws before their enactment. The Law of the Constitu-
tional Court specifies the norms that are subject to preventive control.
These are:
" bills,
" enacted but not yet promulgated statutes,
" Standing Orders of the Parliament, and
" international treaties.
29. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992) (discussing the
question of objectivity in the domain of law).
30. See generally Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in HERBERT WECHSLER,
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3-48 (1961) (defining "neutral principles").
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The review of these special norms can be initiated by the following
government authorities:
" the Parliament, any one of its standing committees, or fifty
Members of Parliament,
" the President of the Republic, and
* the Government (in the narrower sense of the Executive
Branch's Cabinet of Ministers).
The initiation of the proceedings, in all cases, is of a discretionary
character.
The following four different procedures are included in this
jurisdiction:
" On the motion of Parliament, any one of its standing commit-
tees, or fifty Members of Parliament, the Constitutional Court
shall examine the constitutionality of any "contestable" provi-
sion of a bill. If the Constitutional Court declares unconstitu-
tional the contestable provision of the bill, then Parliament or
the person or organ having submitted the bill shall amend it to
eliminate the unconstitutionality.
" Parliament, prior to approval, may convey its standing orders,
indicating the contestable provision, to the Constitutional Court
in order to examine its compatibility with the Constitution. If
the Constitutional Court declares the contestable provision of
the standing orders unconstitutional, Parliament shall amend it
to eliminate the unconstitutionality.
" On the motion of the President of the Republic, the Constitu-
tional Court examines the contestable provision of any act that
has been enacted by Parliament but has not yet been promul-
gated. If the Constitutional Court declares the contestable pro-
vision unconstitutional, the President of the Republic shall not
promulgate the act until the unconstitutionality is eliminated by
Parliament.
" Parliament, the President of the Republic, and the Government
have the right to request that a contestable provision of an inter-
national treaty be examined for constitutionality prior to the rat-
ification of the treaty. If the Constitutional Court declares
unconstitutional the contestable provision of an international
treaty, then it shall not be ratified until the unconstitutionality is
eliminated by the organ or person concluding that treaty.
Under the Constitution, only the President of the Republic faces a
time limit for submitting items to the Constitutional Court. The Presi-
dent of the Republic, when deeming any provision of an Act unconsti-
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tutional, shall convey the provision to the Constitutional Court within
fifteen days--or, if declared urgent by the Speaker, within five days-
from receipt. 3t There is no time limit for a decision by the Constitu-
tional Court.
These detailed procedural rules were enacted by the legislature in
October 1989. The drafters of the regulation, combining all possible
ways of preventive norm control in a rather incoherent way, grasped
too much. The shortcomings of the entire concept of preventive norm
control came to light when the first demand for such control arrived at
the Court in April, 1991. The Court, practicing considerable self-re-
straint, rejected the claim. 32 It investigated the nature of preventive
norm control from a comparative perspective. The Court pointed out
that it may make sense to review the constitutionality of a bill which is
already disputed during the legislative procedure, because preventive
norm control may prevent the annulment of an already-promulgated
legal rule which has been put into practice. Furthermore, this type of
procedure protects the prestige of the legislature. In countries where
there is preventive norm control, the review is most often formal; that
is, it is aimed exclusively at examining the constitutionality of the leg-
islative procedure.
The Court quoted the text of foreign constitutions permitting the
exercise of preventive norm control. These included Article 61 in the
French, Article 278 in the Portuguese, and Article 26 in the Irish Con-
stitutions. Article 127 of the Italian Constitution makes similar provi-
sion for the review of enactments which have yet to be promulgated, in
the event of violations of legislative power. Spain provides for the pre-
ventive norm control of international treaties. Article 78 of the Span-
ish Act on the Constitutional Court requires that the text of the treaty
be previously finalized; similar conditions and regulations applied to
the preventive norm control of bills until 1985, when the Spanish Con-
stitutional Court's jurisdiction to intervene in the legislative process
was annulled.
The Hungarian regulation does not constrain the Court's jurisdic-
tion to the final text of the bill, but makes review possible at any stage
of the legislative process. The Court declared that adjudicating the
constitutionality of some provisions of a bill, the text of which is not
definitive, could possibly mean involving the Constitutional Court in
the everyday legislative process. The Constitutional Court is not an
advisory organ of Parliament; its task is to judge the result of the legis-
31. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution], supra note 3, ch. II, § 26.
32. Judgment of Apr. 20, 1991, Alkomfinybir6sig [Constitutional Court] No. 16/
1991(IV.20)AB (Hung.).
Summer 19921
Michigan Journal of International Law
lative work. Therefore, the actual regulation of the preventive norm
control of bills is incompatible with the principle of separation of
powers.
The Court essentially refused to exercise its jurisdiction and thus,
by implication, declared some provisions of the Act on the Constitu-
tional Court as conflicting with a fundamental principle of the Consti-
tution, namely the principle of separation of powers. Thus, after
restricting its power to give advisory opinions, the Court also curtailed
its power in another critical area. Both Compensation Cases corrected
the inconsistent concept inherent in the Act on the Constitutional
Court. These decisions, however, do not mean that the Court defi-
nitely took the road of self-restraint, though some commentators
maintain that the Court became more sensitive because of the schol-
arly and political attacks on the legitimacy of judicial review in a rep-
resentative democracy.33 Rather, what the Court really did was to
eliminate unreasonable or absurd duties.
In Compensation Case II, the Court did not stop at rejecting the
possibility of preventive norm control. The justices supposed that the
public would consider such cursory treatment to be escaping the issue.
Therefore, they outlined a controversial opinion on the questions at
stake (they called it the "theoretical stance of the Court"). In the ab-
stract language describing this theoretical stance, the Court loosened
the strictness of the scrutiny set up in Compensation Case I. The
Court pointed out that the legislature has excessive freedom in making
distinctions in the details. They stressed the jurisdiction of Parliament
and the government in deciding the concrete method and measure of
the compensation. They also stressed the difference between the
projects of the Government that had been adjudicated in Compensa-
tion Case I and the proposal admitted to Parliament. The Court rec-
ognized that the proposed bill abandoned the idea of reprivatizing land
and intended instead to remedy through a unified "partial property
compensation" the "unjust" damages caused in private property by
the enumerated legal rules within the given period of time. The gen-
eral justification of the bill emphasized that the State acted solely out
of moral obligation, and that the extent of compensation may not be
full.
The permissive language of the ruling could be considered an ex-
ample of self-restraint, suggesting that within the broad limits of con-
stitutionality it is the responsibility of the legislature and not the
33. See Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: The Constitutional Politics of Compensation, 2 SOVIET &
E. EUR. L. 1, 2 (Parker School Bulletin, Columbia University, June 1991).
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Constitutional Court to deal with political questions. Nevertheless,
merely entering into the evaluation of the challenged proposal contra-
dicted the first part of the ruling. Under the circumstances, the state-
ment that the legislature must decide the question meant that the
majoritarian standpoint would prevail, and the proposal of the Gov-
ernment would become law. Finally, the reasoning approving the pro-
posal led the Court to disregard certain elements of the first decision.
COMPENSATION CASE III
Finally, in April 1991 the Compensation Law was passed by Par-
liament and was sent to President Arpid G6ncz for signature. As
mentioned above, the President of the Republic has the right to ask
the Constitutional Court, before signing a law just passed by the legis-
lature, to review the constitutionality of its provisions. This was the
first time that the President exercised this right. His move was in har-
mony with the Court's position that review of constitutionality is pos-
sible only when the final text of the law is approved by the legislature.
The President formulated six concrete questions; furthermore, he
asked in general for the review of the entire Compensation Act. In
answering the six questions, the Court upheld the provisions of the law
in three cases, while in the other three cases it declared them
unconstitutional.
The first question the Court answered referred to the entire con-
cept of the Compensation Act as defined in the first Article of that
Act. This article entitled all those natural persons to partial compen-
sation (indemnification) whose property was violated as a result of en-
forcing legal provisions after June 8, 1949. (The compensation for the
confiscation of church property was defined by Law No. 33 of 1991
passed by the Parliament on July 10, 1991.) The preamble of the
Compensation Act also referred to the scope of the law by setting up a
double purpose: first, the remedy for damages caused unjustly by the
past regime, and second, the settlement of property questions.
The Court, after summing up its previous ruling on the subject,
introduced a new element into the reasoning, stressing the extraordi-
nary conditions and characteristics of the moment in which private
property would be restored. Therefore, it upheld the constitutionality
of the Compensation Law because it imposed a moral obligation to
compensate the former owners. The key word in the Court's opinion
was "novation" or "renewal." Actually, this novation has little to do
with novation in the traditional legal sense of the word ("[s]ubstitution
of a new contract, debt, or obligation for an existing one, between the
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same or different parties"3 4). Here, the emphasis is on the point that
the new regime has no legal obligation to compensate the former own-
ers, only a moral one. Therefore, the new legal obligation defined in
the Compensation Law creates an independent source of obligation.
"The system of novation excludes the references to older legal titles.
Since the novation is constitutionally permissible, there is no reason to
review further, whether there were or could be claims for reprivatiza-
tion in the scope of the effected proper damages."' a3
This gives the State great discretion in deciding on the method and
measure of the compensation. It is interesting how this controversial
linguistic invention tries to harmonize the special character of the
transition with the concept of legal continuity. Because of all the ex-
traordinary circumstances and considerations, the Constitutional
Court considered the novation of the obligation and its fulfillment by
partial compensation to be constitutional. This allowed the State free
play, limited only by certain minor constitutional conditions. As put
by the Court: "The novation may not violate any constitutional rights
or principles. ' 36 Therefore, the government, even when acting on the
grounds of this specific novation, has the obligation to act in such a
way that "no affected party is put into a disadvantageous position. '37
This required, in other words, the application of the Equal Protection
Clause to the present case.
Under this analysis, the Court held the Compensation Law to be
constitutional. "The Act creates a uniform legal basis for compensa-
tion claims for those affected under the Act." According to the ruling
of the Constitutional Court, the provision that violated the principle of
equality was the one which arbitrarily set the starting date of the com-
pensation at June 8, 1949. The Court investigated the entire process of
compensation, reviewing both its content and its timing. The Court
suggested as a possible remedy for the unconstitutional arbitrariness
"that the Compensation Act determines those legal rules, whose appli-
cation before June 8, 1949 caused the same type of damages as the
ones compensated by the present Act, and indicates the final deadline,
within which an Act of Parliament on the compensation related to
those shall be drafted."'38
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (6th ed. 1990).
35. Judgment of July 3, 1991, Alkominybir6sig [Constitutional Court] No. 28/
1991(IV.3)AB, MAGYAR KOZLONY No. 59/1991 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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The Court also rejected another provision of the Act by referring
to equal protection. Under the Act, the extent of a claimant's com-
pensation depends upon whether the entitled person claims arable land
as compensation or requests only the issuance of a compensation
voucher. According to the general rules, the extent of the compensa-
tion is equal to 100 percent up to a damage of 200,000 Forint. If,
however, the basis for compensation is land, and the person entitled to
compensation requires this in the form of arable land, the extent of the
compensation is equal to 100 percent up to the value of 1000 gold-
crown. The multiplier of the damages in the case of arable land is
1000 Forint per gold-crown; therefore, the maximum compensation, 1
million forints, is five times more for those who formerly owned land.
(Gold-crown, a currency used in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, is
still the measuring unit of arable land in the Hungarian land records,
and it reflects the net income of the land.) The government justified
the differentiation with the additional costs and burdens pertaining to
the land compared to other goods.
In addressing this issue, the Court made a very interesting and
controversial analysis. It did not approach the question on purely the-
oretical constitutional grounds, but it tried to unravel the social im-
pact of this provision. It attempted to determine whether the
justification for the discrimination prescribed by the government was
backed by sociological facts. It analyzed the data provided by the
Land and Cartographic Office, and it came to the surprising conclu-
sion that
if there were no distinction between the arable land and other property
assets, about 94.2% of the former land-owners would have been in the
100% compensation. The benefits of the digression limit of 1000 gold-
crowns are enjoyed only by 1.5% of the land. Only 6% of the land is
affected by the determination of a separate digression limit. For at least
94% of the former land-owners the differing digression limit is indiffer-
ent; therefore, for the majority of the land proprietors the extra burdens
mentioned in the reasoning are not counterbalanced by the benefits pro-
vided by the differing extent of compensation. With regard to them
those reasons are not valid, and because of the lack of any other justifica-
tion, the Constitutional Court declares the difference existing between
the 1000 gold-crown and 200,000 Ft value limit as arbitrary and con-
trary to Article 70/A [Equal Protection Clause] of the Constitution. 39
The Court approved the provisions, ensuring that the Compensa-
tion Law provided for claims to compensation by the entitled descend-
ants and the spouse of a deceased person. The Court also approved
another provision of the Compensation Law. While the language of
39. Id.
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Compensation Case I was explicit in protecting the property rights of
cooperatives, Compensation Case II expressed a shift in the Court's
standpoint. Compensation Case III made possible, to a certain extent,
the compensation of the former land-owners by distributing the lands
of the cooperatives. This approved the constitutionality of the Gov-
ernment's plan that compelled the agricultural cooperatives to set
aside a certain part of their lands for the purposes of compensation.
The reasoning of the Court correctly justified this decision, but it
did not really harmonize with the firmness of Compensation Case I.40
The main line of argument was that there is a compelling interest in
limiting the cooperatives' property rights, namely the transformation
of the property of the cooperatives. "This double task is a part of the
unique historical situation, in which the change in ownership as a task
determined by the Constitution takes place, and in which the conse-
quences of a former, opposite change of regime in property relations
which is classified today as unconstitutional has to be settled."' 4' As
the cooperatives acquired their land property mostly from the State,
there is no obstacle to compel them to distribute a part of it for com-
pensation vouchers. It seems that the Court reevaluated its position
toward the cooperatives that had been overly protective of their prop-
erty in Compensation Case I.
In Compensation Case III, the amicus curiae brief of a law profes-
sor (Andris Saj6) and a study prepared by two leaders of the Alliance
of the Free Democrats (Jinos Kis and Mityis Ebrsi) alluded to the
firm position of the Court in the compensation case. It was not by
chance that the only dissenting opinion in Compensation Case III was
written by Justice Imre V6r6s, who considerably influenced the draft-
ing of that part of the reasoning in Compensation Case I which deals
with the protection of the cooperatives' property. (He did not take
part in the decision of Compensation Case II.) His dissenting opinion
considered both the entire concept of compensation and the particular
provisions unconstitutional. He firmly stated that it is the State,
rather than the cooperatives, that has to take responsibility for the
damages.
The final text of the compensation law was approved by Parlia-
ment on July 26, 1991. President Goncz signed the amended version
of the law, and it took effect on August 10, 1991. The legislature fully
40. For a thorough evaluation of the compensation cases, put into a broad theoretical con-
text, see Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism to De-
mocracy: the Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition ofProperty Rights,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 41.
41. Id.
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observed the rulings of the Court. A new provision was inserted in
Article I requiring that a second law be passed no later than Novem-
ber 30, 1991, to compensate for the illegal confiscation of property
between May 1, 1939 and June 8, 1948.42 Under the new provisions
the amount of land to be sold to holders of compensation vouchers
cannot exceed fifty percent of the cooperatives' holdings. (About fifty
percent of the cooperatives' land is owned by the cooperatives them-
selves; the other half is owned by the state or by the members.) This
rule prevails even when the claims of the former owners exceed this
percentage.43 However, several claims arrived at the Court for repres-
sive norm control, and in the future the Court will have to respond to
them. But the final ruling in the series of compensation cases does not
affect the execution of the law.
STATE OF EXCEPTION OR RULE OF LAW
The dilemma behind the seemingly juridical problems raised by the
Compensation Cases is clearly defined by Carl Schmitt, the controver-
sial German constitutional scholar. His concept of rule of law, or
Rechtsstaat, supposed that rule of law refers only to normal conditions
of the State, whereas extraordinary situations require exceptional
means, namely the use of the power of exception. He believed that
"only strong states can afford the luxury of being liberal democracies
... therefore, weak states must be authoritarian to... assure domestic
order." He also sharply criticized the normativism of Hans Kelsen.
Kelsen, the outstanding legal scholar of our century, restricted the
competence of jurisprudence to the study and description of the
"pure" legal norms, and attempted to eliminate from this description
everything that is not strictly law. 45 Schmitt argued that the legal
norm that played a central role in Kelsen's theory is in itself insuffi-
cient, and only the decision gives it actual force and validity. Accord-
ing to Schwab's interpretation in a comprehensive analysis of
Schmitt's political ideas, Schmitt understood decisionism as the capac-
ity of an individual to establish order from a chaotic situation and to
safeguard this newly created stability.46
It followed from this statement that the judiciary cannot be the
42. Actually, this second compensation law was passed by the legislature in April 1992.
43. Karoly Okolicsanyi, Compensation Law Finally Approved, RFE/RL REPORT ON EAST-
ERN EUROPE, Sept. 6, 1991, at 22.
44. GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMI1-F BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936 57 (1989).
45. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1-23 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
46. SCHWAB, supra note 44, at 45.
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safeguard of the Constitution, for the judiciary implies norms, and the
observance and enforcement of norms requires a state of normality.47
The real sovereign stands above the norms; the president, with excep-
tional powers, is capable of performing this role. With the same impe-
tus, he also rejected the idea of the rule of law. Indeed, he pointed out
that during the stable period of the eighteenth century the concepts of
Locke and Montesquieu shadowed the decisionist element in the the-
ory of State and put legal limitations on the sovereign power.48 The
concept of Schmitt, translated into the language of everyday politics,
would suggest that the historical conditions of the transition make
necessary the use of exceptional means and ask to ignore temporarily
the strict measures of the rule of law.
REDRESS FOR PAST INJUSTICES AND THE RULE OF LAW
The Constitutional Court had the opportunity to outline its philos-
ophy on the rule of law in a decision turning down a bill of Parlia-
ment. The legislature passed a bill on November 4, 1991 on the
"prosecutability of serious crimes committed between December 21,
1944 and May 2, 1990 and left unpunished for political reasons." The
law aimed at lifting the statute of limitations for treason, murder, and
grievous crimes. President Goncz had doubts about the constitution-
ality of the law; therefore, he refused to sign and promulgate it. In-
stead, he asked the Constitutional Court to examine the
constitutionality of the law.
A unanimous Court (nine of the ten judges participated in the deci-
sion) declared the law unconstitutional. The Court explained that the
Compensation Law runs counter to the current penal law provision
defining the applicable statute of limitations as the one in effect at the
time that the crime was committed. The lifting of the statute of limita-
tions is unconstitutional because it would create ex post facto legisla-
tion. The Court also reasoned that the fact that certain crimes
remained unpunished for political reasons does not create a constitu-
tional justification for discrimination. An additional reason for hold-
ing the law unconstitutional was the inclusion of treason among these
crimes, because the definition of treason has changed several times
during the past decades: for example, political changes can qualify the
official politics of a State afterwards as treason.
The Court stated that the change of regime in Hungary was based
on legal continuity; according to this reasoning, all legal regulations
47. CARL SCHMITT, DER HOTER DER VERFASSUNG 19 (1914).
48. This idea is repeatedly discussed in CARL SCHMITT, DIE DIKTATUR (1964).
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must correspond to the new Constitution, and all exceptions are un-
constitutional. A change of regime in the legal sense means nothing
more than that laws have to be coordinated with the Constitution
based on the rule of law. As the change was based on the principles of
legality and legal continuity, there is no difference between the laws
enacted before and after the new Constitution. The new Constitution
is the only standard for judicial review.4 9
CONCLUSION: LAW AND POLITICS
There is much concern about the political role of judicial review.
The fundamental claim is that judges and courts must stay away from
politics; they should only interpret the law. But as far as judicial re-
view gives the judiciary the power to invalidate ordinary legislation,
and legislation is obviously not only a legal act but also the outcome of
highly political debates, judicial review is necessarily involved in and
linked to politics. Nevertheless, there is a great difference between the
two systems of judicial review.
In the original American system of constitutional adjudication,
which is called the decentralized type of judicial review, all judicial
organs can rule upon the validity of legislation. In this system, judicial
review is closely connected to the other functions of a judiciary that
not only remains an independent branch in the system of checks and
balances, but also maintains a distance from politics. However, it is
apparent that the activity of the U.S. Supreme Court actually is highly
political. The claim to remain far from politics is reflected in the
'political question' doctrine of that Court. The U.S. Supreme Court
considers a question nonjusticiable only if it has been "committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government." 50
In the centralized type of judicial review, a single judicial organ is
in charge of constitutional review of legislation. t This system prevails
in the European countries. This approach derives from a distrust of
the ordinary judges in adjudicating constitutional issues; it sees them
as incapable of the value-oriented, quasi-political functions inherent in
judicial review.5 2 This system also clearly recognizes the political
character of judicial review. 53 Law, after all, is thoroughly political,
49. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, Alkominybir6sfg [Constitutional Court] No. 11/
1992(III.5)AB, MAGYAR KOZL6NY No. 23/1992 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law).
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
5 1. The two main systems of judicial review, centralized and decentralized, are discussed in
MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46-68 (1971).
52. Id. at 62-63.
53. Id. at 54.
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despite claims that it must remain independent from everyday partisan
politics. 54
The history of the Compensation Cases reveals that the Constitu-
tional Court attempted to translate highly political questions into legal
ones and give them correct legal answers. That history also illustrates
the limited possibility of such efforts. These cases created a compli-
cated task for the Court because too many different interests and ratio-
nales were involved in them. Different and often conflicting issues
were linked together in the complex task that the Compensation Law
tried to solve.
A fundamental consideration was the economic rationality of the
transition to a market economy and to a property system in which
private ownership prevails. Another major issue was the moral ap-
proach to past injustices: how the State could compensate those
whose property rights were gravely violated by the Communist re-
gime. Compensation thus became the subject of a sharp political de-
bate that divided both the society and the political parties. It is also an
important part of the transformation of the legal system. Finally, in
Hungary, where legislation has to face judicial review by an extremely
powerful Constitutional Court, the issue also became an important
constitutional question. The Court clearly strived to solve the extraor-
dinarily complex question solely on the ground of constitutionality.
The challenge to balance so many different considerations resulted
in certain indeterminations and inconsistencies in the consecutive rul-
ings. The first of these problems was whether the Constitutional
Court should take an active part in the transition of the entire legal
system or limit itself to the role of a final watchdog of constitutional-
ity. The Court, led by its President, Uszl6 S61yom, took up an ac-
tivist stand, not only curtailing and invalidating the unconstitutional
acts of the legislation but also developing a concept of constitutional
compensation as a guideline for the legislation. Both the first and sec-
ond compensation cases served that aim, and only the third case can
be considered judicial review in the proper sense. But even in the third
decision, the Court outlined a possible remedy for the unconstitutional
provisions. Though not expressly mentioned, the Court must have
been led to this activism by a peculiar historical responsibility for the
democratic transition.
On the other hand, the Court practiced self-restraint in addressing
some procedural questions. It would be an exaggeration to state that
this led to the acceptance of a sort of "political question doctrine."
54. See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982).
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The Court, however, narrowed its jurisdiction provided by the law and
successfully avoided interfering in political debates.
The Court narrowly interpreted its jurisdiction regarding advisory
opinions and preventive norm control; nevertheless, both areas have
remained the most dangerous tasks of the "least dangerous" branch.55
In the charged atmosphere of political debate, the Court hardly can
remain untouched by the pressure weighed on it by both the press and
public opinion. In these cases, the Court became a direct actor in the
interplay of political forces; it cannot ignore the possible immediate
political consequences of its decisions.5 6 Another disadvantage of ad-
judication before enactment is that the Court must deal several times
with the same issue, and is bound by its previous rulings. It is an
additional difficulty that the Court must sometimes overrule its deci-
sions and adjust its standpoint to the altered conditions.
Despite the difficulties of the issue and the inconsistencies of the
three rulings, the Constitutional Court, after all, successfully faced the
complex problems of compensation. As far as it was possible, the
Court avoided the political pitfalls, and the rulings were correctly jus-
tified by legal arguments. The Court elaborated an important consti-
tutional standard for the adjudication of equal protection and reverse
discrimination. The compensation cases helped this young Court to
develop a coherent philosophy on the supremacy of constitutionalism
that helped it solve other hard cases (such as the statute of limitations
case). In the future, the Court must further develop a comprehensive
view of constitutionalism and interpretation.
55. I wonder whether this characterization of the judiciary stemming from THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) and made popular by Alexan-
der Bickel is valid for the Hungarian Constitutional Court at all.
56. The Independent Smallholders Party was threatening to quit the governing coalition if
the Compensation Law was not enacted.
Summer 1992]
